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Coordination of Inter-Agency Action for 
Nuclear Security in Uganda 
 
Richard Sseggane 




Despite dynamic nuclear security threats to the Eastern and Central African regions, and decisions made 
by the government of Uganda to embark on a nuclear power program, there have not been policies put in 
place to encourage coordination and cooperation among the stakeholders in nuclear security activities. 
Uganda needs to establish policies that streamline roles and mandates for nuclear security agencies, 
including regulators, security and intelligence agencies, police, border control, transport control, customs 
agencies, and others. The policies will allow stakeholder agencies to work together, as necessary, on 
different nuclear security operations to strengthen the national nuclear security regime. This paper 
considers findings from the review of the UK Nuclear Design Basis Approach, and a review of the current 
situation at the state level in Uganda regarding the collaboration of stakeholders in nuclear security. 
I. Introduction: Nuclear Security in Uganda 
Nuclear security is a relatively new concept in need of governance and regulatory systems in Uganda, as 
well as many other African countries. Nuclear security is a resource-intensive undertaking and thus its 
infrastructure and capabilities have not advanced in most developing countries: because these 
governments have prioritized their available resources to address challenges seen as more life-threatening, 
including poverty, hunger, health, energy, democracy, and social infrastructure development. With 
growing nuclear technology applications and the increase in threats, Uganda must establish an effective 
and efficient national nuclear security plan [1]. 
Nuclear facility threats have increased as a result of increased applications in nuclear and radiological 
technology, making nuclear security a priority. There is widespread use of radioactive sources in 
medicine, industry, mining, road construction, and other fields in Uganda. In 2015, the government 
announced their intentions to embark on a nuclear power program. Their intention is problematic due to 
the increased threats of nuclear terrorism from the Al-Shabaab terrorist group, who have previously 
conducted severe terrorist attacks in Uganda. Al-Shabaab increases the nuclear security threat by taking 
advantage of the porous borders around Uganda for smuggling nuclear or radioactive materials for sale or 
blackmail. 
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Roles and responsibilities are, by default, distributed among a number of stakeholders who are charged 
with lead roles in different aspects of nuclear security within a state. In most cases, the major stakeholders 
are government institutions that are established by national legal instruments. In many cases, the various 
agencies coordinate and collaborate to assign responsibilities for advancement in nuclear security. 
Collaborations between government agencies in Uganda are implemented through memoranda of 
understanding between agencies in line with the legal instruments that establish specific agencies. There 
is no established mechanism for coordination of joint operations, and this presents a challenge for nuclear 
security. 
Many different institutions work towards enhanced nuclear security—including regulation of nuclear and 
radiological practices, border control, transport control, import and export control, and radioactive waste 
management. Together, the institutions attempt to ensure nuclear security and safety, but they are 
currently without an official, comprehensive, and collaborative program, which leads to gaps in 
communication. Gaps can cause doubt and conflict among institutions and inhibits an efficient execution 
of nuclear security work, hindering the effectiveness of the national nuclear security program at large. 
A clear concept of collaborative communication, lobbying, sourcing, allocation, and management of 
resources for nuclear security facilitates transparency and increases the effectiveness of nuclear security. 
With all stakeholders having a round table where priorities, strategies, and decisions can be negotiated 
and adopted, communication and consultation with external stakeholders and management in both bi-
lateral and multi-lateral relationships will be more efficient. 
A. Collaboration among Nuclear Security Stakeholder 
Agencies in Uganda 
Uganda has protocols in place for the legal framework of nuclear security as it relates to the use of 
nuclear material and radioactive sources. However, there are no protocols in place ensuring efficient and 
effective coordination in the execution of inter-agency nuclear security activities. An absence of 
permanent and inclusive institutional collaboration among key stakeholders for nuclear security policy 
has led to identifiable gaps in inter-agency action. 
The lack of a collaborative program hinders the optimization of the available resources, such as radiation 
detection equipment and trained human resources. Agencies are only aware of what they themselves have 
and are often unable to access assistance when needed, despite the fact that it may be available within the 
country. 
B. Objective 
The objective of this paper is to propose a plan for coordination and cooperation among major Ugandan 
nuclear security stakeholder agencies in congruence with the nuclear security responsibilities and 
operations. It identifies stakeholders’ nuclear security responsibilities and provides proposals for 
establishing and maintaining an effective plan for inter-agency action. 
II. Why Inter-Agency Coordination? 
A permanent framework for stakeholder inter-agency coordination and cooperation in nuclear security 
would achieve the following goals: 
a) Make the most efficient use of each organization’s resources in the context of existing mandates, 
legal framework, and the objectives of the state’s nuclear security regime. 
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b) Facilitate a common understanding of security situations, their consequences, and the way they 
are expected to develop through an exchange of information (which may include monitoring and 
technical data). 
 
c) Foster a common and respectful approach to developing mandates for emergency-related 
activities and procedures that would serve as communication to stakeholders, reports for the 
government, and statements to the media and public. 
 
d) Exchange information regarding an agency’s specific capabilities, actions planned, actions taken, 
information received, and information released. 
 
e) Promote efficient and coordinated provision of assistance to other parties in accordance with their 
mandates, since several organizations may be approached with the same information or request. 
 
f) Facilitate ad-hoc agreements on dividing work among national organizations, which may be 
needed in emergency situations, nuclear security events, incidents, and other relevant situations, 
as well as to solve any other practical problems. 
III. Current Status: The Challenge 
Due to the increase in radiological applications, the initiation of Uganda’s nuclear power program, and 
the increase of nuclear security threats as discussed in section one, the following have been identified as 
key issues affecting the coordination of inter-agency action for nuclear security in Uganda: 
(1) The major stakeholder agencies and their roles in nuclear security have not clearly been identified 
or utilized for the advancement of national nuclear security activities. The border and aviation 
police departments are currently left out of the national nuclear security arrangements. 
 
(2) The legal mandates of several stakeholder agencies do not clearly state roles, responsibilities, or 
accountabilities for nuclear security. They also do not provide for methods enabling several 
agencies to cooperate with each other. 
 
(3) There are no state-level methods or programs that allow coordination and collaboration among 
stakeholders that identify communication, commands, and reporting structures in nuclear security 
initiatives. 
With the lack of established nuclear security methods, the country faces inescapable realities related to its 
nuclear security regime, and coordination of inter-agency action for nuclear security: 
(1) Rising trends in the use of nuclear technologies in Uganda for health, agriculture, industry, 
education, research, and power generation. 
 
(2) Increased need for cooperation in nuclear security, with respect to the dynamic local and regional 
nuclear security threat environment. 
In light of these realities, inter-agency action for nuclear security should focus on eliminating duplicate 
roles and optimizing resources for nuclear security. It should also identify key nuclear security 
stakeholders. It should focus on eliminating gaps and overlaps in the nuclear security regime through 
streamlining accountabilities for various aspects of nuclear security in the country. 
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IV. Reviewing the UK Nuclear Design Basis Threat 
Approach 
This section presents the findings from a study of the United Kingdom’s (UK’s) national system for 
prevention of acts of nuclear terrorism and protection of nuclear material, radioactive sources, associated 
equipment, and facilities in the civil nuclear industry. This information was obtained from publicly 
accessible documents and other open and unclassified sources of information, mainly the internet.1 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS) 
have commended the UK for having implemented a solid, efficient, and effective nuclear security regime 
as regards both physical protection of materials and facilities, and preparedness for detection and response 
to nuclear security events [2]. 
A. The UK Design Basis Threat 
In the United Kingdom the Design Basis Threat (DBT) document is referred to as the Nuclear Industries 
Malicious Capabilities (Planning) Assumptions (NIMCA) and its preparation is coordinated via the Joint 
Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), which is the UK centre for all source analysis and assessment of 
international terrorism. JTAC sets threat levels and issues analytical reporting to government departments 
and agencies [3]. 
NIMCA is prepared for systematic national threat assessments that take into account the inventory of civil 
nuclear material, radioactive sources, and associated equipment and facilities. The country acquires input 
from all relevant security and intelligence organizations and agencies, both at home and abroad, including 
those from other states. JTAC performs the coordinating role for the preparation of NIMCA. 
The UK’s DBT is a dynamic document that has a formal annual review process. JTAC examines all 
current intelligence relating to the UK’s nuclear industry and can demand a review and update as needed 
per new threat information provided by JTAC. Conclusions are used to establish the type of threat the 
civil nuclear industry should protect against as stipulated in the nuclear security regulatory requirements, 
the Nuclear Industries Security Regulations of 2003 (NISR 2003). The Conclusions are recorded in a 
document which was issued by the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), known as the ‘NIMCA’, (UK’s 
DBT). This provides the basis for the design, implementation, and management of security measures and 
systems undertaken by regulated civil nuclear industries in the United Kingdom. 
NIMCA sets the “threat” bar for physical protection systems and the provision of security resources by 
the operators which are expected to be sufficient enough to sustain an effective and proportionate security 
posture on a daily basis. It also allows for a re-posturing of security activity if a national change in threat 
demands it [3, 4]. 
(Figure 1) illustrates the UK’s approach to DBTs, and how its outcomes are conceptually put to use by the 
UK’s nuclear industry. It includes three sections: Section 1 involves national agencies that conduct an 
overall national threat assessment and, from it, extract conclusions for the NIMCA; Section 2 involves 
two independent state agencies that are charged with overseeing the implementation of protective 
measures to counter the NIMCA; and Section 3 involves the nuclear industry or the licensed nuclear 
operators who have the responsibility to put in place industry-level protection measures against the 
NIMCA threats. 
 
1 No interviews were conducted and no single individual from either within or outside the United Kingdom was 
consulted or interviewed in the preparation of this work for purposes of studying the UK nuclear security system. 
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Figure 1: UK Nuclear DBT Approach at a glance.  Image Source: 
http://spaces.icgpartners.com/index2.asp?NGuid=EB4EC67E60964507A925F56CE316334E 
V. Way Forward: Proposals 
A nuclear security–focused research case study for coordination of inter-agency action for Uganda was 
compared to a good practice model used in the United Kingdom. This section describes the need for 
effective collaboration and the need to further generate recommendations towards improving 
coordination. This paper makes a number of general and specific stakeholder recommendations, based on 
which a model for coordination and cooperation of nuclear security in Uganda can be developed. 
A. General Recommendations 
Below are suggestions for coordination of inter-agency action for strengthening Uganda’s nuclear security 
regime. 
1) The border police and aviation police departments are currently left out of the arrangements for 
inter-agency nuclear security operations. These departments must be brought on board to close 
the gaps in combatting illicit trafficking of radioactive sources and nuclear material. This will 
strengthen the nuclear security detection methods in airports and border entry points, thus 
minimizing the risk of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials across Uganda’s 
borders [5]. 
 
2) National-level policies should be developed for coordination among the stakeholder agencies that 
specify the means and mechanisms for how several agencies will cooperate in executing their 
mandates related to nuclear security [6]. 
 
3) Under the auspices of the nuclear and radiological regulatory body, inter-agency nuclear security 
working groups should be established and required to participate in regular meetings. There 
should be formally appointed representatives from the relevant stakeholder agencies, as per its 
periodic work plan, to prepare the DBT, to organize nuclear security measures for major public 
5
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events, to monitor shipments of nuclear or radioactive materials, and to perform any other tasks 
as assigned by the national nuclear security committee.  
4) With the introduction of the nuclear power program, a special unit of the police should be 
established, trained, and equipped with the skills and abilities to protect nuclear installations, 
defend/respond to attacks to them, and pursue and recover lost nuclear or radioactive materials. 
This measure has been effective in the United Kingdom and is implemented through the Civil 
Nuclear Constabulary [7]. 
 
5) The national security and intelligence agencies should intensify their efforts in assessing nuclear 
threat information and putting measures and expertise in place to manage threats to the nuclear 
industry [8]. As the potential targets for theft and sabotage of nuclear and radioactive materials 
and facilities increase, so should the national intelligence service to effectively counter it. 
 
6) The National Security Organizations Act of 1987 should be reviewed to establish the duties of the 
National Security Council secretariat, adding roles for receiving, reviewing, and disseminating 
the nuclear threat information to the head of the national nuclear and radiological regulatory body 
for preparation, review, and update of the DBT [9, 10]. 
 
7) There should be open communication among agencies before and during nuclear security 
operations. A clear chain of command and distribution of key responsibilities should be assigned, 
especially during joint operations and incidents, as well as a designated top office from which 
incident or operations management instructions are taken [11]. 
 
8) Communication officers for media and the public should be established for nuclear security 
events to inform the public about the inter-agency action for nuclear security in the country [12]. 
 
9) Defined procedures on how to activate interagency in a joint operation or in response to an 
incident is essential; they should be clear about to whom, when, and how the incident or operation 
is declared complete and closed. It should further be specified how recovered/seized nuclear or 
radioactive material should be stored and managed [8]. 
B. Stakeholder-Specific Recommendations 
This section provides recommendations for roles and activities specific to each individual stakeholder 
agency to effectively coordinate inter-agency action for nuclear security. The recommendations have been 
tabulated with an additional recommendation about whether a particular stakeholder should be part of the 
National Nuclear Security Committee (NNSC), based on the agency’s mandate and sensitivity of 
information accessible to this committee. 
Table 1: Recommended stakeholder roles for coordinated interagency action for nuclear security in Uganda 
# Stakeholder agency Roles and responsibilities NNSC 
Membership 
1 Nuclear & 
Radiological 
Regulatory body 
• Issuing regulations and guidance for all nuclear 
and radiological activities in the country and 
monitoring and verifying adherence to them. 
• Inspecting and enforcing the nuclear security 
regulations and monitoring potential threats to 
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• Implementing international commitments related 
to nuclear security and disseminating scientific, 
technical, and regulatory information to 
stakeholders. 
• Maintaining communication among and 
coordinating with other nuclear security agencies 
in and outside the country. 
• Obtaining nuclear threat information from the 
National Security Council secretariat and 
coordinating the preparation of the national 
nuclear Design Basis Threat [5]. 
• Establishing physical protection and security 
requirements for facilities based on the adopted 
DBT statement [14]. 
• Coordinating and organizing administrative and 
capacity- building inter-agency activities, 
including training of personnel and working 
group meetings. 
• Providing nuclear and radiological expert 
assistance and guidance to other stakeholders in 
the prevention of, detection of, and response to 
incidents [10]. 
• Organizing training and capacity development 
for other stakeholders. 
facilities in view 




and advice during 
nuclear security 
events. 
2 National Police • Enforcing nuclear security laws, regulatory 
requirements, and other related laws within the 
state. 
• Participating in nuclear threat assessment and 
preparation of the national nuclear Design Basis 
Threat [5]. 
• Collecting and sharing additional intelligence 
information with intelligence and other security 
agencies on the nuclear threats. 
• Acting as guards for some sites and acting as first 
responders to incidents and nuclear security 
events in and outside nuclear facilities. 
• Providing security support and backup as off-site 
responders to nuclear and radiological facilities. 
• Participating in nuclear security measures for 
major public events in collaboration with other 
stakeholder agencies [10]. 
• Responding to incidents and nuclear security 
events, arresting culprits, managing crime scenes, 
collecting evidence, performing forensic 










perform well and 
support other 
agencies.  
3 National Security 
Council (Secretariat) 
• Receiving the state’s security intelligence 
information from the internal and external 
security organizations and processing it to define 
No 
7
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the threats to the country’s nuclear and 
radiological facilities and activities. 
• Disseminating the nuclear threat information to 
the head of the national nuclear and radiological 
regulatory authority at periodic, prescribed 
times—and as need arises when the threat 
changes. 






4 Security Intelligence 
Service [15] 
• Gathering and submitting intelligence on threats 
to the nuclear security and any related aspects of 
the National Security Council and relevant 
security agencies. 
• Participating in threat assessment and 
development of the nuclear DBT.  
• May work hand-in-hand with other security 
agencies in analyzing criminal and military 
strategic intelligence relating to nuclear security.  
Yes 
They are crucial 
in DBT 
development 
5 Customs and Border 
Control Agency 
• Verifying compliance with legal and regulatory 
requirements for transport, import, export, and 
trans-shipments of nuclear material and 
radioactive sources.  
• Detection and initial response to illicit trafficking 
of nuclear material and radioactive sources at 
borders, ports, and airports [16]. 
• Notifying and communicating with fellow 
nuclear security competent authorities upon 
detection of trafficked nuclear and radioactive 
material. 
• Maintaining and exchanging information with the 
regulator on import/export and trans-shipments 
of nuclear material and radioactive sources [8]. 
Yes 






6 Licensed Operators • Implementing the best physical protection 
systems for the nuclear material and radioactive 
sources and associated equipment within their 
facilities against a Design Basis Threat [14]. 
• Designing, implementing, and maintaining 
technical solutions that satisfy regulatory 
requirements related to physical protection and 
security of nuclear material or radioactive 
sources in their facilities. 
• Ensure first-level control of radioactive sources 
and nuclear material in their facilities and 
practices. 
• Verify the skills and appropriate training of 
personnel employed in facilities. 
• Inform the regulatory body of any event affecting 
or likely to affect the security of the nuclear 
No 
They may not be 
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material or radioactive sources and the facility at 
large, and as appropriate, request support. 
• Maintain coordination with relevant state and 
local organizations that are involved in the 
nuclear security efforts. 
• Implement a quality assurance system for the 




• Assisting in the dissemination of information, 
evacuation of residents, and general management 
of the crisis in case of a nuclear security event. 
• Mobilizing the population near nuclear and 
radiological facilities to adhere to security 






8 The Military  • Detecting and neutralizing of cross-border 
nuclear threats, advising fellow competent 
authorities on security of information [8]. 
• Stepping in when nuclear security events escalate 
out of hand for the police and for incidents and 
attacks that are beyond the defined DBT.  
• Providing support to on-site security at nuclear 
power plants and similar facilities in case of 
high-level events when contacted [14]. 
Yes 
They need to 
keep updated on 
the DBT to 
streamline terms 
and situations for 
their intervention 
in civil nuclear 
security.  
9 Emergency Medical 
Service 
• Developing national capacity for handling and 
treatment of cases of high exposure and 
contamination, including mechanisms for seeking 
external assistance in escalated cases. 
• Providing the treatment of individuals affected by 
contamination or exposure resulting from a 
nuclear security event or incident including 




only on call and 




10 Foreign Affairs 
Ministry 
• Continuously scrutinizing and being party to 
relevant international legal instruments for 
nuclear security. 
• Keeping the country engaged in bilateral and 
multilateral international nuclear security 
arrangements and programs. 
• Requesting for external assistance in cases of 
escalated nuclear security events [8]. 
Yes 





11 Justice Ministry • Drafting or preparing and adopting state-level 
nuclear security legislation, including laws, 
regulations, and inter-agency coordination 
No 
9
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 procedures. Also ensuring presence of provisions 
for prosecution and penalties for offenders.  
No roles outside 
legal actions. 
12 National Nuclear 
Security Committee  
• Overseeing the coordination of inter-agency agency action and 
developing general policies and strategies for the state’s nuclear 
security regime. 
• Reviewing the national nuclear DBT and making policy decisions for 
implementation of suitable nuclear security measures. 
• Developing and reviewing concepts of operation for inter-agency 
action in nuclear security in the state and appraising nuclear security 
performance. 
• Approving and adopting strategies and measures for inter-agency 
action in nuclear security. 
 
C. The Inter-Agency Coordination Model 
The recommendations above would result in the most practical model for coordinating inter-agency 
action for nuclear security in Uganda, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Coordination model for inter-agency nuclear security action in Uganda. 
10
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VI. Conclusion 
In view of Uganda’s nuclear security situation, with lessons from the UK’s approach to collaboration of 
nuclear stakeholders, and also in consideration of international recommendations from the IAEA, a 
number of general and specific recommendations were generated and a coordination model for inter-
agency action for nuclear security was suggested. 
Stakeholders’ coordination on both global and state levels is critical to achieving the intended outcomes 
of the nuclear security efforts and enables effective use of taxpayer resources. Without coordination on all 
levels, communication is poor, money is wasted, equipment goes unused, gaps are unnoticed, 
opportunities are missed, and good will is squandered. No one wins awards or makes headlines with this 
thankless task of effective inter-agency coordination; however, without it there is a greater security risk, 
and aspiring nuclear terrorists are more likely to acquire the materials, skills, and opportunities to kill 
millions and inflict economic and political havoc. 
This paper discussed the state of nuclear security in Uganda with a major focus on collaboration among 
the different nuclear security stakeholder agencies.  These observations were made in response to the 
growing nuclear and radiological application prospects with respect to the prevailing nuclear security 
threats. It discussed the need for effective coordination of inter-agency action in nuclear security, 
outlining a number of collaboration opportunities; it also looked at possible risks arising from 
uncoordinated approaches of stakeholder agencies in the country. The approach adopted in the UK in the 
development and use of their DBT, NIMCA, was reviewed and noted as a commendable practice case. 
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